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ON THE SITUATION IN PALESTINE AND THE WAR CRIME
OF TRANSFER OF CIVILIANS INTO OCCUPIED
TERRITORY
ABSTRACT. This paper considers the war crime at Article 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome
Statute, ’the transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its
own civilian population into the territory it occupies’, by addressing the doctrinal
elements of the provision in light of the impact which the practice of transfer of
Israeli civilians into occupied territory has had on the application of the rule of
international law to the broader situation in Palestine. The provision is distinct
among war crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction as it refers to the activity of a
state – the occupying power – in addition to that of the individual perpetrator. This
feature reﬂects the structural issues that the provision was designed to address, and
emphasizes that its purpose is not so much to confront direct physical violence, but
rather to prevent colonial practices. Despite the political signiﬁcance of the under-
lying conduct there has been comparatively little analysis of the war crime itself.
Following an overview of how Israel’s transfer of civilians into occupied territory
challenges international law’s distinction between civilian and combatant and has
given rise to the charge of apartheid, the paper considers the drafting history of
Article 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute, reﬂecting on the provision’s unusual con-
struction, before reviewing Israel’s state responsibility for unlawful transfer, and
considering the temporal jurisdiction of the ICC and the nature of continuing and
continuous crimes.
I INTRODUCTION
The war crime set forth at Article 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute as,
the transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts
of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies’, and the
rule at Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention from which it
is derived, that States may not deport or transfer parts of their own
civilian population into a territory they occupy’, are marked by
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several characteristics distinguishing them from the corpus of rules
and crimes with which they are categorized. In particular, the war
crime refers to the activity of the state – the occupying power – in
addition to that of an individual perpetrator, a detail emphasizing
that its purpose is not merely to confront direct physical force, but
also to oppose colonialism and its attendant structure of violence.
This de´calage between the war crime and the other provisions of
Article 8 is evident in the claim that since not explicitly relating to
atrocity’, the conduct prohibited is not serious enough to warrant
labelling and proscription as a war crime. In 1998, explaining its
refusal to vote in favour of adoption of the Rome Statute due to the
inclusion of Article 8(2)(b)(viii), Israel’s delegate asked: can it really
be held that such an action as that listed in Article 8 above really
ranks among the most heinous and serious war crimes, especially as
compared to the other, genuinely heinous ones listed in Article 8?’1
Although an isolated position then, the question requires some
attention since there is a broader unease with how the thrust of
international law discourse can appear to be locked into ad hoc re-
sponses to crisis and to excessive’ or heinous’ violations, while
reluctant to confront the political and cultural structures which
undergird the broader reality of perpetual war.2 That international
criminal law is alert to the administrative and structural elements of
oppression has been evident since the prosecution of serious viola-
tions of human rights as the crime against humanity of persecution by
the post-Second World War tribunals.3 The rationale for criminal-
izing apartheid in the 1973 Apartheid Convention4 was not to re-
spond to atrocity, but to condemn and confront a racist system of
administrative and structural domination. A similar approach can be
seen in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yu-
goslavia’s aﬃrmation that the crime of persecution can encompass
acts which, although not in and of themselves inhumane, are con-
1 Statement by Eli Nathan, Head of the Delegation of Israel (17 July 1998),
available at https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1232ae/; A/CONF.183/SR.9, § 33 (17
July 1998).
2 Hilary Charlesworth, International Law: A Discipline of Crisis’ 65Modern Law
Review 3 (2002) 377; Samuel Moyn, Civil Liberties and Endless War’ & David Cole,
A Defense of Civil Libertarianism’ Dissent Magazine (Fall 2015).
3 Kevin Jon Heller The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of Interna-
tional Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2011) Ch 10.
4 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid 1973, UNTS Vol 1015.
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sidered inhumane because of the discriminatory grounds on which
they are taken’.5 The impetus towards advancing the application of
international criminal law beyond atrocity is clearly perceived in
contemporary analyses of poverty,6 discrimination,7 asylum status,8
and hate speech.9
A particular, contextual, characteristic of the war crime as applied
to the situation in Palestine is the rarity with which political discourse
around Israel’s settlement policy acknowledges its criminal nature.
Addressing the notion of human shields’ in the context of colonial
rule and of Israeli military policy, Judith Butler cautions that To
assume that a war crime’ is easily recognised, and that there will be
general consensus that one has been committed’, is merely a wager.10
While the international community has been consistent in reaﬃrming
that Israel’s settlement policy is unlawful, such statements appear in
abstracto, and there remains a broad refusal to recognize and to
condemn the transfer of Israeli civilians into occupied territory as
criminal activity for which individuals must bear responsibility.
Contrary to the unimaginable atrocities’ of the Rome Statute’s
Preamble, the transfer of Israeli civilians into occupied territory has,
for a prolonged period, been an overt and organised state policy,
executed on a large scale and in a systematic manner, such that it is a
deﬁning feature of the military occupation of Palestinian and Syrian
territory. Beyond the civilian and combatant statuses deﬁnitive of the
law of armed conﬂict, a signiﬁcant section of Israel’s settler popula-
tion may be more appropriately categorised as commuters, such is the
extent to which Israel’s imposition of facts on the ground’ has in-
corporated the settlement population and infrastructure into the state
of Israel. Bearing in mind Kamari Maxine Clarke’s observation that
5 Trial Judgment, Prosecutor v Tadic´, 7 May 1997, IT-94-1-T, §715.
6 Gwilym David Blunt, Is Global Poverty A Crime Against Humanity?’ 7 Inter-
national Theory 3 (2015) 539–571.
7 Ruby Axelson, State-Sponsored Hatred and Persecution on the Grounds of
Sexual Orientation: The Role of International Criminal Law’ in Schweppe & Walters
(eds.), The Globalisation of Hate: Internationalising Hate Crime? (Oxford University
Press, 2016) at 277.
8 Ioannis Kalpouzos & Itamar Mann, Banal Crimes Against Humanity: The Case
of Asylum Seekers in Greece’ 16 Melbourne Journal of International Law 21 (2015).
9 Wibke K. Timmermann, Incitement in International Law (Routledge, 2014);
Richard A. Wilson, Inciting Genocide with Words’ 36 Michigan Journal of Inter-
national Law 1 (2015) 277.
10 Judith Butler, Human Shields’ 3 London Review of International Law 2 (2015)
233.
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continuing violations such as colonialism or apartheid, since they
challenge strict notions of legal time, present us with less
stable questions of perpetratorhood and create multivalent legal
dilemmas [involving] questions of jurisdiction, admissibility and evi-
dence’,11 it will be demonstrated that the war crime of transfer of
civilians into occupied territory, while lacking signiﬁcant precedential
guidance, and to a signiﬁcant extent obscured by the need to respond
also to direct and massive physical violence, remains a war crime. It
addresses, with adequate clarity and certainty, a clear and speciﬁc
criminal conduct which continues to be pursued as a matter of sys-
tematic public policy.
Following an overview of how Israel’s transfer of civilians into
occupied territory undermines international law’s distinction between
civilian and combatant and has given rise to the charge of apartheid,
the paper considers the drafting history of Article 8(2)(b)(viii) of the
Rome Statute, reﬂecting on the provision’s unusual construction,
before reviewing Israel’s state responsibility for unlawful transfer,
and then considering the temporal jurisdiction of the ICC and the
nature of continuing and continuous crimes.
II TRANSFER WITH IMPUNITY
Since 1967 Israeli governments have justiﬁed the transfer of parts of
their civilian population into occupied territory by reference to a
combination of strategic/military and religious/nationalistic goals.12
The Israeli High Court, having chosen not to acknowledge the
applicability of Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention,
established the legalistic basis by which land in occupied territory was
to be seized for the construction of settlements in the Beth El case of
1978.13 The Court predicated its approval of construction of civilian
settlements on the ability of the military commander to demonstrate
that the settlement would serve a veriﬁable strategic military function.
By this method, as noted by David Kretzmer, the Court’s view on the
security function of civilian settlement […] paves the way for actions
that are not compatible with the occupying power’s fundamental
11 Kamari Maxine Clarke, Reﬁguring the Perpetrator: Culpability, History and
International Criminal Law’s Impunity Gap’ 19 International Journal of Human
Rights 5 (2015) 592–614, 596–597; Lorenzo Veracini, Introducing’ 1 Settler Colonial
Studies 1 (2011) 3.
12 David Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice (SUNY, 2002) 76.
13 Ayyub v. Minister of Defence, 33(2) PD, p. 113, 1978.
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duty not to use the occupation as a means of acquiring territory by
use of force.’14
According to the UN’s Oﬃce for the Coordination of Humani-
tarian Aﬀairs, since 1967 Israel has oﬃcially established approxi-
mately 150 settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory, in
addition to some 100 outposts’ erected by Israeli civilians without
formal authorization. As of 2011 the Israeli civilian population in
occupied Palestinian territory was estimated at 520,000, while some
43% of West Bank territory was allocated to settlement municipal
councils.15
While sustained violence and the denial of the Palestinian right to
self-determination are clear consequences of the settlement policy,16
in the context of such ﬁgures, the prolonged nature of the occupation,
and Israel’s claims to have annexed occupied territory, two additional
consequences necessitate some comment.
The ﬁrst relates to the increasing currency attached to claims that
the system of segregation between Israeli civilians in occupied terri-
tory – the settlers – and the Palestinian population – the protected
persons’ of the Geneva Conventions – constitutes apartheid.17 In
2012 the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimina-
tion, in its Concluding Observations on Israel’s periodic report, drew
attention to General Recommendation 19 (1995) concerning the
prohibition of all policies and practices of racial segregation and
apartheid. The Committee urged Israel to take immediate measures
to prohibit and eradicate any such policies or practices which
14 Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice 83; David Kretzmer, The Law of Bel-
ligerent Occupation in the SUPREME Court of Israel’ 94 International Review of the
Red Cross 885 (2012) 213.
15 UNOCHA-OPT, The Humanitarian Impact of Israeli Settlement Policies:
Update December 2012.
16 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, § 122.
17 Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Terri-
tories Since 1967’ 84 American Journal of International Law 51 (1990), at 52; D.
Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice: The Supreme Court of Israel in the Occupied
Territories (New York: State University of New York Press, 2002), at 76; V. Tilley
(ed.), Beyond Occupation: Apartheid, Colonialism and International Law in the
Occupied Palestinian Territories (London: Pluto Press, 2012); Interview with Raja
Shehadeh’ 94 International Review of the Red Cross 885 (2012) 13, at 17; John
Dugard & John Reynolds, Apartheid, International Law, and the Occupied Pales-
tinian Territory’ 24 EJIL 3 (2013) 867.
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severely and disproportionately aﬀect the Palestinian population in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory’. It expressed extreme concern at:
the consequences of policies and practices which amount to de facto segrega-
tion, such as the implementation by the State party in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory of two entirely separate legal systems and sets of institutions for
Jewish communities grouped in illegal settlements on the one hand and
Palestinian populations living in Palestinian towns and villages on the other
hand.18
The Human Rights Council’s 2013 Fact-ﬁnding Mission Report on
Israel’s settlement activity, while avoiding the apartheid label, also
stressed this point, reiterating that the settlements are established for
the exclusive beneﬁt of Israeli Jews’ through a system of total seg-
regation … supported and facilitated by a strict military and law
enforcement control to the detriment of the rights of the Palestinian
population’.19
Beyond the use of physical force against Palestinians by Israeli
state oﬃcials in maintaining this regime, there is an increasing con-
vergence between and among sectors of the settler population and the
occupying power’s military/security apparatus.20 In addressing the
correlation between the two forms of Israeli violence – institutional
military violence and non-institutional civilian violence’,21 Nir Gazit
describes how the political and legal structures of the Israeli occu-
pation have provided the necessary degrees of freedom’, so to speak,
that allow, and even support, a proliferation of settlers’ violence
against Palestinian civilians.’22 The 2013 Mission Report had
emphasized the prevalence of settler violence, frequently in the
presence of Israeli police and military:
18 Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Dis-
crimination: Israel. CERD/C/ISR/CO/14-16 (9 March 2012) § 24.
19 Report of the independent international fact-ﬁnding mission to investigate the
implications of the Israeli settlements on the civil, political, economic, social and
cultural rights of the Palestinian people throughout the Occupied Palestinian Ter-
ritory, including East Jerusalem, A/HRC/22/63 (7 February 2013) § 103.
20 Udi Lebel, Settling the Military’ 21 Israel Aﬀairs (2015) 361; Ami Pedahzura &
Holly McCarthy, Against all odds – the paradoxical victory of the West Bank
settlers: interest groups and policy enforcement’ 21 Israel Aﬀairs 3 (2015) 457.
21 Nir Gazit, State-Sponsored Vigilantism: Jewish Settlers’ Violence in the
Occupied Palestinian Territories’ 49 Sociology 3 (2015) 438, 447.
22 Gazit, State-Sponsored Vigilantism’ 450.
MICHAEL G. KEARNEY
the identities of settlers who are responsible for violence and intimidation are
known to the Israeli authorities, yet these acts continue with impunity. The
Mission is led to the clear conclusion that there is institutionalised discrimi-
nation against the Palestinian people when it comes to addressing violence. The
Mission believes that the motivation behind this violence and the intimidation
against the Palestinians as well as their properties is to drive the local popu-
lations away from their lands and allow the settlements to expand.23
Such developments, and the challenge which the status of settlers’
pose to the principle of distinction under international humanitarian
law present a particular dilemma to the application and coherence of
international law. Their collective presence in occupied territory is
unlawful, their function at least partially military, yet as civilians,
they enjoy immunity from attack, and are thus on a formally equal
footing with the Palestinians whose land they have seized. Interna-
tional law places no restriction as to the numbers of combatants an
occupying power may choose to deploy and accepts that a number of
civilians will be required to support the military function of occu-
pation forces: Geneva Convention III for example requires that
certain categories of civilian are to be accorded Prisoner of War
status.24 That these are exceptions to be understood restrictively is
illustrated by the commentary to Article 63(1) of Additional Protocol
1 – that civil defence organisations in occupied territory shall not be
required to give priority to the nationals or interests of that [Occu-
pying] Power’ – which notes: as the transfer of the Occupying
Power’s own civilian population into occupied territory is prohibited
by the Fourth Convention, there should really only be military’
nationals of the Occupying Power in such territory, apart perhaps
from [the] exception of some civilians who had settled there before the
occupation.’25
In its written pleading to the International Court of Justice before
the Wall Advisory Opinion, and in a rare petition for the application
23 Supra note 19, § 107. Also, UN News Centre, Israeli settler violence must be
prosecuted, says UN human rights chief’ 1(8 March 2013); Yesh Din, The Road to
Dispossession: A Case Study – The Outpost of Adei Ad (2013); B. Ravid, U.S. State
Department deﬁnes settler violence as terrorism, Ha’aretz (18 August 2012); D.
Byman & N. Sachs, The Rise of Settler Terrorism: The West Bank’s Other Violent
Extremists, Foreign Aﬀairs (14 August 2012); Al-Haq, Special Focus: Settler Attacks
in the West Bank (22 October 2015).
24 Art. 4.4; Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 75
UNTS 135.
25 Yves Sandoz et al. (eds.), Commentary on the Additional Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions (Martinus Nijhoﬀ, 1987) at 751, § 2498.
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of humanitarian law to occupied territory, Israel reminded the Court
of the civilian status of settlers and their immunity from attack: Even
the harshest of Israel’s critics have been constrained to acknowledge
that such attacks are a violation of the norms of international
humanitarian law and general international law and cannot be jus-
tiﬁed.’26
An example of such acknowledgement is an Amnesty Interna-
tional report of 2002 on the violence of the Al-Aqsa Intifada rejecting
claims on the part of Palestinian armed groups that the prohibition
on attacking civilians does not apply to settlers in the Occupied
Territories because the settlements are illegal under international
humanitarian law; because settlements may have military functions;
and because many settlers are armed’. Condemning Palestinian at-
tacks on settlers as crimes against humanity, Amnesty concluded that
settlers as such are civilians, unless they are serving in the Israeli
armed forces.’27 While this conclusion is correct, though a contem-
poraneous Human Rights Watch report distinguished settlers taking
a direct part in hostilities,28 the analysis acknowledged, though
without further comment as to deeper problems this revealed, that:
Although the militarization of settlements is strongest in Gaza, some
of the settlements in the West Bank also have military functions. The
IDF may use them as staging posts for their operations or to detain
people in their custody. A large number of settlers are armed and
settlers have sometimes attacked Palestinians and destroyed Pales-
tinian houses and other property.’29
In the context of a prolonged occupation, characterized by colo-
nial settlement, the Israeli courts have set aside international
humanitarian law’s categorization of Palestinians in occupied terri-
tory as protected persons, prioritizing instead settlers’ needs as
commuters to be protected. Eyal Weizman has explained how the
World Zionist Organisation, in preparing its 1983 Masterplan for
Settlement in the West Bank through the year 2010’, identiﬁed that
state subsidies to speciﬁc settlements would be related to economic
26 Written Statement of the Government of Israel on Jurisdiction and Propriety 29
January 2004 para 3.51.
27 Amnesty International, Without distinction – attacks on civilians by Palestinian
armed groups’ (AI Index: MDE 02/003/2002, 2002) 23.
28 Human Rights Watch, Erased In A Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against
Israeli Civilians’ (2002) 55.
29 Amnesty International, Without Distinction – Attacks on Civilians by Pales-
tinian Armed Groups’ (AI Index: MDE 02/003/2002, 2002) 24.
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demand such that high demand areas were those within a travel time
of 30 min from the outer ring of Tel Aviv metropolitan region and
about 20 min’ drive from that of Jerusalem’’.30 This settlement
complex’, which Ariel Handel contends should not be construed as
an aggregate of discrete gated communities linked to each other with
wide roads, but as a single gated community’,31 and the extent to
which settlers’ commute from, and transfer back into, occupied ter-
ritory are normalized, is illustrated by the Israeli High Court ruling
on the application of military orders prohibiting Palestinians of
occupied territory from travelling on Route 443.
Giving judgment in the Abu Saifa case in 2009, the Court de-
scribed Route 443 as a major traﬃc artery connecting the area of the
coastal plain [Tel Aviv] and the Modi’in [settlement] bloc to the area
of Jerusalem’ noting its use for travel by residents of the Israeli
settlements in the Area’.32 Harpaz and Shany have critically observed
how the Court could not ignore the large number of Israelis moving
in and out of the Occupied Territories on a daily basis for a variety of
commercial, religious, recreational, and other reasons’ and their in-
creased reliance on military measures of protection in a deteriorating
security environment.’ The Court’s interpretative solution’ in the
face of an increasing settler population was to reconﬁgure Regulation
43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations. By expanding the concept of
security interests so to include the protection of Israelis in the
Occupied Territories’ the Court rendered the term ‘‘protected per-
sons’’ introduced by Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention
(which explicitly excludes nationals of the Occupying Power)
increasingly irrelevant.’33
In light of the violence and the continued impunity by which the
occupation is being pursued, the process by which the privileges of
Israeli civilian settlers are being read such as to trump the rights of
Palestinians as protected persons, brings to mind China Mie´ville’s
30 Eyal Weizman, Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation (Verso, 2007)
124.
31 Ariel Handel, Gated/gating community: the settlement complex in the West
Bank’ 39 Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 4 (2014) 504, 515.
32 HCJ 2150/07 Abu Saﬁya v. The Minister of Defense (Dec. 29, 2009) p. 28 En TN.
33 Guy Harpaz & Yuval Shany, The Israeli Supreme Court and the Incremental
Expansion of the Scope of Discretion under Belligerent Occupation Law’ 43 Israel
Law Review 514 (2010) 535, 542. Valentina Azarov Exploiting A Dynamic’ Inter-
pretation? The Israeli High Court of Justice Accepts the Legality of Israel’s Quar-
rying Activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’, EJIL: Talk! Blog of the
European Journal of International Law, 7 February 2012.
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damning conclusion that The chaotic and bloody world around us is
the rule of law.’34 Echoing the statements made by Israel at the Rome
Conference in 1998, a recent commentary denied that the transfer of
Israeli civilians into occupied territory could be of signiﬁcance to the
International Criminal Court since the provision is a war crime with
no direct victims and the commission of which in the circumstances in
question does not involve violence’.35 Eugene Kontorovich’s evalu-
ation reﬂects a broader strand of rhetoric capitalising upon the
emergence of a Lawfare narrative, itself a reaction to Palestinian legal
advocacy,36 which seeks to retool human rights so as to reconstitute
Israeli settlers as victims, and the establishment of a Palestinian state
or proposals to remove settlements as being tantamount to ethnic
cleansing. Kontorovich for example, could go so far as to criticise the
war crime for being a highly restrictive and xenophobic zero immi-
gration rule’.37 In studying such developments, and the establishment
of human rights NGOs to advocate colonisation’, Perugini and
Gordon observe how a convergence of settler-activism and Israeli
state interests, through organisations such as Shurat HaDin and
Yesha for Human Rights, has prompted the emergence of what they
have termed a human right to dominate and to colonise’.38
III ARTICLE 8(2)(B)(VIII) OF THE ROME STATUTE
The ICRC’s Customary Law Study of 2005 aﬃrmed that Rule 130, as
derived from Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, was a
norm of customary international law applicable in international
armed conﬂicts’,39 yet found no evidence of any relevant national
34 China Mie´ville, The Commodity-Form Theory of International Law: An
Introduction’ in S. Marks (ed.) International Law on the Left: Re-examining Marxist
Legacies (CUP, 2008) at 132.
35 Eugene Kontorovich, When Gravity Fails: Israeli Settlements and Admissi-
bility at the ICC’ 47 Israel Law Review 3 (2014) 399.
36 Michael Kearney, Lawfare, Legitimacy and Resistance: The Weak and the
Law’ 16 Palestine Yearbook of International Law (2010) 79.
37 Kontorovich When Gravity Fails’ 389.
38 Nicola Perugini & Neve Gordon, The Human Right to Dominate (OUP, 2015).
39 J.M. Henckaerts & L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), ICRC Customary International
Humanitarian Law Volume I Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005),
at 462.
MICHAEL G. KEARNEY
case law, criminal or otherwise.40 Following Palestine’s initial ap-
proach to the ICC in 2009 a shift in this emphasis gradually mate-
rialized. The Report of the Human Rights Council’s 2013 Fact-
ﬁnding Mission on Israel’s settlement activity, having reference to
correspondence from Palestine to the UN Secretary-General and
Security Council declaring that Israeli settlement activities’ constitute
war crimes under the Rome Statute, indicated that it would apply not
only the law of state responsibility but also international criminal
law.41 The Report did not engage expansively with international
criminal law, simply acknowledging that The transfer of Israeli cit-
izens into the OPT, prohibited under international humanitarian law
and international criminal law, is a central feature of Israel’s practices
and policies’,42 and remarking that Palestinian ratiﬁcation of the
Rome Statute may lead to accountability for gross violations of
human rights law and serious violations of international humani-
tarian law and justice for victims.’43
Other than a jurisdictional hearing before the ICTY where the
defence drew on Article 49(6) and Rule 130 to successfully oppose an
apparent charge of a crime of colonisation’,44 it was not until 2014
and the United Kingdom Supreme Court’s judgment in Richardson
and another v DPP that judicial consideration, albeit brief, was given
to the scope and meaning of the war crime.45 The appellants in
Richardson unsuccessfully challenged convictions for aggravated
trespass arising from a protest against the sale in a London shop of
Ahava products manufactured at an Israeli settlement in occupied
Palestinian territory. It was put to the Court that Ahava was guilty
of aiding and abetting the transfer by the Israeli authorities of Israeli
citizens to a territory (the OPT) under belligerent occupation’ and
that aiding and abetting such transfer was an act ancillary to a war
crime’ under the Rome Statute as incorporated into the law of
England and Wales by the International Criminal Court Act 2001.
While denying the application on the facts before it, the Court
40 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law
Volume I at 457.
41 Supra note 19 §17.
42 Ibid § 38.
43 Ibid § 104.
44 Decision on Several Motions Challenging Jurisdiction, Prosecutor v Gotovina
et al., 19 March 2007, IT-06-90-PT, paras 58–66.
45 Richardson and another (Appellants) v Director of Public Prosecutions (Re-
spondent) [2014] UKSC § 8.
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accepted with respect the war crime argument’ that if a person,
including the shopkeeper company, had aided and abetted the
transfer of Israeli civilians into the OPT, it might have committed an
oﬀence against [the 2001 Act]’.46
The only jurisprudence relevant to the prohibition of transfer of
civilians noted in the ICRC customary law study was the condem-
nation by post-Second World War tribunals of Germanization’
policies executed by the Nazis in occupied Europe.47 The indictment
in the Case of the Major War Criminals before the International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, in alleging the war crime of plunder,
referred to portions of occupied territory in Eastern Europe as having
been reserved for exclusive settlement, development, and ownership
by Germans and their so-called racial brethren’, while a separate
count, Germanization of Occupied Territory’, charged that In cer-
tain occupied territories purportedly annexed to Germany the
defendants… introduced thousands of German colonists’ in violation
of the Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws and customs of war, the
general principles of criminal law as derived from criminal laws of all
civilized nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which
such crimes were committed and Article 6(b) of the Charter.’’48 The
judgments at Nuremberg and other post-war trials tended to address
what would become a series of discrete international crimes as more
generalized bundles of conduct, on this particular issue not leaving
much speciﬁc jurisprudence of a positively precedential character.49
Pictet’s Oﬃcial Commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention,
as ratiﬁed by Israel in 1951 and Palestine in 2014, explains the motive
for the prohibition in Article 49(6) as the prevention of a practice
adopted during the Second World War by certain Powers, which
transferred portions of their own population to occupied territory for
political and racial reasons or in order, as they claimed, to colonize
46 Ibid § 10.
47 J.M. Henckaerts & L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), ICRC Customary International
Humanitarian Law Volume II Practice Part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2005), at 2963, 2968–2969; C. Meindersma, Legal Issues Surrounding Popu-
lation Transfers in Conﬂict Situations’ 41 Netherlands International Law Review 1
(1994) 31, at 44–45.
48 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal
Nuremberg 14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946, at 63–66.
49 Heller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunals at 226. Separate and partly dissenting
opinion of Judge Schomberg, Prosecutor v. Naletilic & Martinovic, IT-98-34-A, 3
May 2006, paras 10–16.
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those territories.’50 With the expansion of the category of Grave
Breaches in Additional Protocol I of 1977, adopted by consensus,
Article 85(4)(a) provided that when committed wilfully and in vio-
lation of the Conventions or the Protocol’, the transfer by the
occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the
territory it occupies, in violation of Article 49 of Geneva Convention
IV, is a Grave Breach and thus a crime subject to universal juris-
diction. The Commentary notes that the practice, is now a grave
breach because of the possible consequences for the population of the
territory concerned from a humanitarian point of view.’51 Israel has
not ratiﬁed the Additional Protocol while Palestine ratiﬁed in 2014.
Bothe et al’s commentary on the Additional Protocols points out
that events in the Middle East (transfer of civilians into occupied
territory), Bangladesh (unjustiﬁable delay in the repatriation of
prisoners of war or civilians), and southern Africa (practices of
apartheid) had directly inﬂuenced the inclusion at Article 85(4) of a
strange collection of oﬀences unrelated to one another’.52 Describing
as remarkable’ that Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention
should include a prohibition of the transfer of civilians into occupied
territory only at para. 6 at the end’, they note that the inversion of
this position in the Additional Protocol is a practical experience in a
speciﬁc case: the settlement of Israelis on the Golan Heights and the
West Bank of Jordan.’53
That criminal responsibility should accrue to individuals respon-
sible for the transfer of civilians into occupied territory was restated
at Article 22(2)(b) of the International Law Commission’s 1991 draft
Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind which
declared that the establishment of settlers in an occupied territory
50 Jean Pictet (ed.) Geneva Convention Relative To The Protection Of Civilian
Persons In Time Of War (Geneva International Committee Of The Red Cross, 1958)
at 283. A reﬂection of such sentiment may be seen in a General Assembly resolution
of 1966 condemning as a crime against humanity, the policy of the Government of
Portugal, which violates the economic and political rights of the indigenous popu-
lation by the settlement of foreign immigrants in the Territories [under Portuguese
administration] and by the exporting of African workers to South Africa.’ UNGA
res. 2184 (XXI) 1966 Question of territories under Portuguese administration, § 3.
51 Sandoz, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 § 3504.
52 M. Bothe et al., New rules for victims of armed conﬂicts: commentary on the two
1977 protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Martinus Nijhoﬀ, 1982),
at 517–518.
53 Ibid at 518.
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and changes to the demographic composition of an occupied terri-
tory’ are an exceptionally serious war crime’. The Commentary states
that: it is a crime to establish settlers in an occupied territory and to
change the demographic composition of an occupied territory…
Establishing settlers in an occupied territory constitutes a particularly
serious misuse of power, especially since such an act could involve the
disguised intent to annex the occupied territory.’54
Article 20(c)(i) of the Commission’s 1996 draft Code of Crimes
against the Peace and Security of Mankind, also declared, without
further commentary, that The transfer by the Occupying Power of
parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies’ is a
war crime when committed wilfully in violation of international
humanitarian law.55
3.1 Negotiations at Rome
Article 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute sets forth the war crimes of
transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its
own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the depor-
tation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied
territory within or outside this territory.’ Where William Schabas
states that negotiation of the provision proved troublesome’ due to
Israeli opposition, he concludes that it was not very controversial, as
it was well accepted by most delegations’.56 Yoram Dinstein con-
siders that the provision was the prime example of the controversial
segments’ of the deﬁnition of war crimes since, while Geneva Con-
vention IV set deportation as a grave breach, the transfer of civilians
into occupied territory was not.57 Knut Do¨rmann reports that the
provision prompted the most diﬃcult negotiations’ at Rome, with
agreement reached only after intensive informal negotiations which,
54 UN Doc A/46/10 (1991) 2 YBILC 2, 105, para 7.
55 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind with com-
mentaries 2 Year Book of the International Law Commission 2 (1996). The UN
Transitional Administration in East Timor, in adopting Regulation No.2000/15
establishing panels with jurisdiction over serious criminal oﬀences, aﬃrmed at Sec-
tion 6(1)(b)(viii) that the transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of
parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies’ constitutes a war
crime in international armed conﬂicts. UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (6 June 2000).
56 William Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome
Statute (OUP, 2010) 234.
57 Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed
Conﬂict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), at 232–233.
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due to the sensitivity of the issue, were almost exclusively conducted
between interested delegations behind closed doors’.58 Academic
commentaries on the drafting process at Rome are replete with
similar, typically sparse, and frequently inconclusive observations as
to the provision.
The war crime had been on the table from the informal texts of
April 1996 under the subhead other serious violations of the laws or
customs of war’.59 An August 1996 working paper draft statute
submitted by France made no reference to the transfer of civilians
into occupied territory,60 though it reappeared in a February 1997
working paper prepared by the ICRC and submitted by Switzerland
and New Zealand.61 The provision was initially placed in square
brackets as para 19(f) in informal working papers62 though the
brackets were promptly dropped.63 A subsequent informal working
paper included the option of deleting the provision,64 while a new
formulation was proposed by Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, and Switzer-
land.65 This was included as option 3 in the Zutphen Draft Statute,
that was to set the base for negotiations at Rome, and which pro-
vided for four options on sub-paragraph (f)66:
Option1 The transfer by the Occupying Power of parts of its own
civilian population into the territory it occupies;
58 K. Do¨rmann, War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, with a Special Focus on the Negotiations on the Elements of
Crimes’ 7 Max Planck YearBook of United Nations Law (2003) 341–407, at 395.
59 Chairman’s Informal Text No. 4 (4 April 1996), at 4; Proceedings of the
Preparatory Committee during the Period 25 March-12 April 1996, A/AC.249/
CRP.9/Add.4 (11 April 1996), at 7.
60 Working paper draft statute A/AC.249/L.3 (6 August 1996).
61 A/AC.249/1997/WG.1/DP.2 (14 February 1997), at 2. And was again included
in a draft consolidated text of the statute, with a footnote stating that This provision
should be read together with article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.’ A/
AC.249/1997/WG.1/CRP.2 (20 February 1997), at 3–4.
62 This was followed by a note to the eﬀect that the UK believed square brackets
should remain.’ Informal working paper on war crimes (14 July 1997), at 2. https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/7ba0b8/. A/AC.249/1997/WG.1/CRP.7 (3 December 1997),
at 2.
63 A/AC.249/1997/WG.1/CRP.8 (5 December 1997), at 2.
64 Informal Working Paper on War Crimes (11 December 1997), at 3.
65 A/AC.249/1997/WG.I/DP.22 (11 December 1997).
66 Zutphen Draft A/AC.249/1998/L.13 (4 February 1998), at 23–24.
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Option2 The transfer by the Occupying Power of parts of its own
civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deporta-
tion or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied
territory within or outside this territory;
Option3 (i) The establishment of settlers in an occupied territory and
changes to the demographic composition of an occupied territory;
(ii) The transfer by the Occupying Power of parts of its own
civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deporta-
tion or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied
territory within or outside this territory;
Option 4 No paragraph (f).
The Summary Records of the meetings of the Committee of the
Whole and of the Plenary Meetings through June 1998, while
showing an even split between states favouring options 2,67 or 3,68
provide little insight to the debates. China leaned towards option 2,
seeking the addition of the words which is not justiﬁed by the
security of the population or imperative military reasons’ after, into
the territories it occupies’.69 Option 1 received less overt support,70
though the UK stated that it well understood the preference for
options 2 and 3 but preferred option 1, because option 2 overlapped
with the ‘‘grave breaches’’ provisions of the Geneva Conventions,
which were in any event covered by section A, and option 3 made new
law.’71 Japan also stated that sub-paragraph (f) should be included as
it referred to a grave breach of Additional Protocol I’, and that while
ﬂexible with regard to the options tentatively preferred option 1’.72
67 Preference for option 2 was noted by Jordan, Costa Rica, Vietnam, Denmark,
Sweden, Belgium (on the grounds that it exactly reproduced the text of article 85.4.a
of Additional Protocol I), Russia, Brazil, Venezuela, Switzerland, Norway, Italy,
Iran, and Senegal. (A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.4, (17 June 1998) §§ 47, 62, 69, 73, & 75; A/
CONF.183/C1/SR.5 (18 June 1998) §§ 5, 35, 46, 50, 58, 63, 66, 72, & 83).
68 Preference for option 3 was noted by Syria, Libya, UAE, Greece, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Korea, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Thailand, Egypt, Algeria, and Cuba. (A/
CONF.183/C.1/SR.4 (17 June 1998) §§ 44, 63, 66, & 67; A/CONF.183/C1/SR.5 (18
June 1998) §§ 3, 13, 18, 21, 23, 26, 33, 48, & 69.
69 A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.4 (17 June 1998) § 65. Proposal Submitted by China:
Article 5 War Crimes, A/CONF.183/C.l/L.5 (18 June 1998). Also A/CONF. 183/C.
1/SR.33 (13 July 1998), § 40.
70 Macedonia, Turkey, and Chile. A/CONF.183/C1/SR.5 (18 June 1998) §§ 60, 70,
and 92.
71 Ibid § 38.
72 Ibid § 56.
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As negotiations continued the United States indicated that sub-
paragraph (f) should ideally not be included in the Statute’, but that
if it were, then the words directly or indirectly’, not being drawn
from Additional Protocol I, should be deleted.’73 This phrase had
been added to the option 2 construction of the crime in a Bureau
Discussion Paper dated 6 July 1998, the alternative options having
been excised.74 The academic consensus is that the words were in-
cluded as a result of wide support for the Arab Group’s eﬀorts to
ensure clarity with regards to the acts or omissions of the occupying
power with whom the crime is linked.75 According to Kittichaisaree,
by this reading responsibility is to be attributed to an Occupying
Power not only if it deliberately organizes the transfer of its own
population into occupied territory, but also where it takes no eﬀective
steps to prevent its own population from organizing such a trans-
fer’.76
Israel was the only state to steadfastly support the deletion of the
provision,77 and particularly opposed’ the reference to transfer di-
rectly or indirectly’ on the grounds that it had no basis in customary
international law.’78 This opposition appears to have been primarily
based on the indirect’ aspect, which David Scheﬀer understood as
having been an Egyptian inspired move to snare the Israeli practice
of providing tax incentives to its citizens to move to the Israeli set-
tlements on the West Bank and in Gaza, which most of the world
regarded as occupied territory following the 1967 war’.79
Ultimately, option 2 of the Zutphen Draft, with the addition of the
phrase directly or indirectly’, was adopted as the ﬁrst part of Article
8(2)(b)(viii).
73 A/CONF. 183/C. 1/SR.33 13 July 1998, § 26.
74 A/CONF.183/C.1/L.53 Bureau: discussion paper regarding part 2 (6 July 1998).
Further included at A/CONF.183/C.1/L.59 [incorporating A/CONF.J83/C. 1/L59/
Corr.I of 1 July 1998] Bureau: proposal regarding part 2 (10 July 1998).
75 Also H. von Hebel, Article 8(2)(b)(viii)’ in R.S. Lee (ed.), The International
Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence
(Transnational, 2001), at 159.
76 K. Kittichaisaree, International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001), at 168.
77 A/CONF.183/C1/SR.5, 18 June 1998, § 80.
78 A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.27, 8 July 1998, § 32; A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.35, 13 July
1998, § 25.
79 David Scheﬀer, All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes
Tribunals (Princeton University Press, 2012), 205.
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3.2 The Elements of Crimes
The Elements of Crimes with respect Article 8(2)(b)(viii) adopted by
the Assembly of States Parties in 2002 read:
1. The perpetrator: (a) Transferred, [FN 44: the term transfer’
needs to be interpreted in accordance with the relevant provisions
of international humanitarian law] directly or indirectly, parts of
its own population into the territory it occupies; or (b) Deported
or transferred all or parts of the population of the occupied
territory within or outside this territory.
2. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with
an international armed conﬂict.
3. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that estab-
lished the existence of an armed conﬂict.
During negotiations, the US delegation at Prepcom sought to sig-
niﬁcantly raise the threshold for the commissionof thewar crime inorder
to allay fears’ that (im)permissible gloss’ had been placed on Article
49(6) of Geneva Convention IV by the addition of the term directly or
indirectly’.80 The US proposal, which does not appear to have received
any support, would have required that the perpetrator intended to eﬀect
the compulsory transfer, ona large scale, of parts of thepopulationof the
Occupying Power into such occupied territory’. Additional elements of
the proposal required that the perpetrator eﬀected such transfer’, in-
tended that such transfer would endanger the separate identity of the
local population in such occupied territory’, and that the transfer
worsened the economic situationof the local populationand endangered
their separate identity.’81 Conversely, the Arab Group proposal sought
to broaden the scope by spelling out what appear to be the applicable
modes of liability: The perpetrator, directly or indirectly: (a) Induced,
facilitated, participatedorhelped in anymanner in the transferof civilian
population of the Occupying Power into the territory it occupies’.82
80 R. Wedgwood, The International Criminal Court: An American view’ 10
European Journal of International Law 1 (1999) 93, at 99; G. Hafner et al., A re-
sponse to the American view as presented by Ruth Wedgwood’ 10 EJIL 1 (1999) 108,
at 120–121.
81 Proposal by the USA (PCNICC/1999/DP.4/Add.2). Japan had also proposed
inclusion of a requirement that Such transfer or deportation was conducted in
violation of article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention’ (PCNICC/1999/WGEC/
DP.12).
82 Proposal by Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, the
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The text as adopted was as initially proposed by Costa Rica,
Hungary, and Switzerland: The perpetrator: (a) Transferred, directly
or indirectly, parts of its own population into the territory it occu-
pies.’83 This text had been supplemented by an oral amendment
proposed by Switzerland to include civilian’ and of the Occupying
Power’ as found in Article 8 itself, so as to read: The Perpetrator: (a)
Transferred, directly or indirectly, parts of the civilian population of
the occupying power into the occupied territory it occupies’.
The Swiss intention had been to retain the reference to the occu-
pying power as present in the Statute, rather than refer to the indi-
vidual perpetrator only. According to von Hebel, this was rejected
due to the Arab Group’s concern that reference in the Elements to the
Occupying Power might be interpreted as requiring some form of
government involvement and thereby as limiting the scope of the
provision.’84
Strikingly, the Elements omit the word civilian’ before popula-
tion’ as is found in the Statute, an omission which not Do¨rmann (or
anyone else) can explain: Given that the substantive discussions were
held among some interested delegations, it is not clear whether the
omission was a conscious decision, and if so for what reason, or a
mere drafting error.’85 von Hebel notes that after a ﬁnal compromise
on the text had been reached in August 1999, Turkey made an
informal suggestion to add the word civilian’ in order to bring it in
line with the Statute, yet the amendment as proposed, and the deci-
sions to reject it, were not exclusively based on grammatical rea-
sons.’86
The ﬁnal text also includes a footnote to the word transferred’,
noting that The term transfer’ needs to be interpreted in accordance
with the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law.’
Do¨rmann surmised that the footnote states the obvious, without
Footnote 82 continued
Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, the UAE and Yemen (PCNICC/1999/WGEC/
DP.25).
83 Proposal by Costa Rica, Hungary and Switzerland (PCNICC/1999/WGEC/
DP.8).
84 von Hebel, Article 8(2)(b)(viii)’ at 161.
85 Knut Do¨rmann et al., Elements of War Crimes Under the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court: Sources and Commentary (Cambridge: ICRC, Cam-
bridge University Press, 2003), at 209.
86 von Hebel, Article 8(2)(b)(viii)’ at 161, fn 81.
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giving any further clariﬁcation’,87 and von Hebel, describing it as
deliberately ambiguous’, suggests that most states considered this
additional wording as at most a clariﬁcation, not an extension of the
scope of the relevant provisions.’88 The footnote does appear
redundant given that the Statute’s Article 21 on applicable law pro-
vides that in second place’, after the Statute itself, with its Elements
of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, are included as a
source, the established principles of the international law of armed
conﬂict’.89
Von Hebel considers the ﬁnal text of the Elements to be gram-
matically incorrect – as clearly seen in the manner by which the
paragraph seems to refer to the act of individual and of a state in the
selfsame breath such that the perpetrator’ transfers its own popu-
lation’ into the territory it occupies’, where the it’ in question relates
to a state as an occupying power – and that it would have been
preferable for the Swiss proposal to have been adopted with the
inclusion of the oral amendment,90 a reasonable conclusion.
3.3 Directly or Indirectly
Regarding the inclusion of the phrase directly or indirectly’, RS Lee
queried whether In legal terms… this additional language has any
signiﬁcant impact’.91 As previously noted, the phrase has been
understood as reaﬃrming that the responsibility of the occupying
power for transfer may be triggered by acts or omissions. It also
appears that the Arab Group understood the phrase as conﬁrming,
unnecessarily, that the Statute’s various modes of liability apply also
to this particular provision. One issue on which the phrase has been
regarded as declarative, is the opinion that transfer of civilians
encompasses both voluntary and forced transfer.
A page dated 2001 on Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs website
claims that: International humanitarian law prohibits the forcible
transfer of segments of the population of a state to the territory of
87 Knut Do¨rmann, War Crimes Under the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, With a Special Focus on the Negotiations of the Elements of
Crimes’ Max Planck UNYB 7, at 395.
88 von Hebel, Article 8(2)(b)(viii)’ at 159.
89 Article 21.1.b ICCSt.
90 von Hebel, Article 8(2)(b)(viii)’ at 161.
91 R.S. Lee, The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute:
Issues, Negotiations, Results (Leidin: Martinus Nijhoﬀ, 1999), at 113.
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another state which it has occupied as a result of the resort to armed
force.’92 This contention, that humanitarian law prohibits only the
forced transfer of civilians into occupied territory, ﬁnds little, if any,
support. Kretzmer has noted that the International Court of Justice’s
rejection of suggestions that the term transfer’ in Article 49(6) implies
an element of coercion, was well-founded’, on the basis that the
object of the Fourth Geneva Convention is to protect civilians in the
occupied territory and not the population of the occupying power’,
and that From the point of view of the protected persons, whether
the transfer of outsiders into their territory is forcible or not would
seem to be irrelevant.’93 Dinstein, noting that A transfer entails
movement of persons into an occupied territory with a view to set-
tling there’ stresses that where the ﬁrst paragraph of Article 49 speaks
of forcible transfers’ the attachment forcible’ is absent from the
sixth, a point made even clearer in the Rome Statute, though strictly
speaking no embellishment is required.’94 In the Wall Advisory
Opinion, the International Court of Justice stated that Article 49(6):
prohibits not only deportations or forced transfers of population such as those
carried out during the Second World War, but also any measures taken by an
occupying Power in order to organize or encourage transfers of parts of its own
population into the occupied territory. In this respect, the information pro-
vided to the Court shows that, since 1977, Israel has conducted a policy and
developed practices involving the establishment of Settlements in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, contrary to the terms of Article 49, paragraph 6…95
With respect the war crime in the Rome Statute, the ICRC simi-
larly understand that: The inclusion of ‘‘indirect’’ indicates that the
population of the occupying power need not necessarily be physically
forced or otherwise compelled. Therefore, acts of inducement or
92 Israel Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, Israeli Settlements and International Law’
21 May 2001, at http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Peace/Guide/Pages/Israeli%
20Settlements%20and%20International%20Law.aspx.
93 David Kretzmer, The Advisory Opinion: The Light Treatment of International
Humanitarian Law’ 99 AJIL 88 (2005), at 91. Also Kittichaisaree, International
Criminal Law at 169: Michael Cottier, Article 8 War Crimes: para 2b (xviii)’ in
Triﬀterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court:
Observer’s Notes, Article by Article (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgellschaft, 1999),
at 214; Do¨rmann et al., Elements of War Crimes Under the Rome Statute at 211.
94 Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009), at 239–240.
95 The Wall Advisory Opinion § 120.
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facilitation may fall under this war crime.’96 Cottier agreed with the
ICRC conclusion, noting that while this has probably been the view
of the great majority of States in regard to the prohibition under the
law of the Geneva Conventions and Protocols, a few States have been
of the opposite view. The addition of ‘‘directly or indirectly’’ serves to
clarify this point.’97
IV RESPONSIBILITY OF ISRAEL AS AN OCCUPYING
POWER
Given the rationale underlining the criminalization of the transfer of
civilians into occupied territory, this war crime may only be perpe-
trated in the context of an international armed conﬂict. As reaﬃrmed
in theWall Advisory Opinion, the territory situated between the Green
Line and the former eastern boundary of Mandate Palestine, as well
as the Gaza Strip, has been subject to military occupation by Israel
since 1967: Subsequent events in these territories … have done
nothing to alter this situation. All these territories (including East
Jerusalem) remain occupied territories and Israel has continued to
have the status of occupying Power.’98
Given the reference to an occupying power, the war crime can be
understood also as a type of crime’ of state. It is not dissimilar to the
Statute’s crime of aggression, yet in several respects it closer resem-
bles the concept of a crime against humanity. Schabas observed that
96 Annex I: Paper prepared by the ICRC on article 8, paragraph 2 (b), (viii), (x),
(xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xxi), (xxii) and (xxvi), of the Statute of the ICC, PCNICC/
1999IWGECIINF.2 (14 July 1999), at 13.
97 Cottier Article 8 War Crimes: para 2b (xviii)’ at 214.
98 The Wall Advisory Opinion § 78; On occupation see S. Darcy and J. Reynolds,
An Enduring Occupation: The Status of the Gaza Strip from the Perspective of
International Humanitarian Law’ 15 Journal of Conﬂict and Security Law 2 (2010)
211. A footnote to the Elements of Crimes, accompanying the requirement under
Article 8(2)(a), that The conduct took place in the context of and was associated
with an international armed conﬂict’, states that The term international armed
conﬂict’ includes military occupation.’ The footnote continued to state that this also
applies to the corresponding element in each crime under article 8(2)(a).’ Since the
Elements to each of the paragraph (2)(b) crimes include the selfsame element, the
failure of the footnote to clarify its application thereto is likely a result of inadequate
drafting. As noted by Schabas There is no evidence in the travaux pre´paratoires that
a distinct deﬁnition of armed conﬂict applicable to article 8(2)(b) was ever consid-
ered.’ W. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome
Statute (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), at 203.
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the language of the chapeau to Article 8, that the court shall have
jurisdiction in respect of war crimes when committed as part of a plan
or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes’, had
in general terms aligned war crimes more closely with crimes against
humanity,99 and the provision here seems emblematic of Cherif
Bassiouini’s remark that Crimes against humanity and genocide are
essentially crimes of state, as are sometimes war crimes, because they
need the substantial involvement of state organs, including the army,
police, paramilitary groups, and the state’s bureaucracy’.100
The general rule on state responsibility for internationally
wrongful acts is that the only conduct attributed to the State at the
international level is that of its organs of government, or of others
who have acted under the direction, instigation or control of those
organs, i.e. as agents of the State.’101 In the Wall Advisory Opinion,
the International Court of Justice cited with approval UN Security
Council resolution 446 (1979) calling upon Israel, as the occupying
Power, to abide scrupulously’ by Geneva Convention IV and not to
transfer parts of its own civilian population into the occupied Arab
territories’. The Court also referred to Security Council resolution
465 (1980) which described Israel’s policy and practices of settling
parts of its population and new immigrants in [the occupied] terri-
tories’ as a ﬂagrant violation’ of the Convention.102 Aﬃrmation of
the illegality of Israel’s settlement policy and practice has been
widespread, repetitive, and consistent. The legal opinion of the US
State Department on Israel’s settlement policy, as stated in 1978, was
that the establishment of the civilian settlements in those territories is
inconsistent with international law.’103 The Conference of the High
99 W. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (3rd edn.,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), at 117.
100 M.C. Bassiouni, The Normative Framework of International Humanitarian
Law’ in Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law: Sources, Subjects and Contents
(3rd edn., Martinus Nijhoﬀ, 2008), at 495; W. Schabas, State Policy as an Element of
International Crimes’ 98 Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology (2007–2008), 953–
982.
101 Article 4. International Law Commission Report, A/56/10, 2001.
102 The Wall Advisory Opinion § 120. Also Opinion of Israeli Ministry of Foreign
Aﬀairs Legal Adviser Theodor Meron on settlements in the Occupied Territories’, 18
September 1967, available athttp://www.soas.ac.uk/lawpeacemideast/resources/
ﬁle48485.pdf.
103 Letter of the State Department Legal Advisor, Herbert J. Hansell, Concerning
the Legality of Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories’ 17 International Legal
Materials (1978), at 777–779.
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Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention and the
Council of the European Union104 reaﬃrmed the illegality of the
settlements in the said territories and of the extension thereof.’105
Military occupation of foreign territory is perhaps the ultimate
manifestation of the state’s exercise of public authority, primarily
through its military organs, but also through the legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial branches. Article 3 of Hague Convention IV of 1907
provides that a belligerent party shall be responsible for all acts
committed by persons forming part of its armed forces’,106 while
Article 91 of Additional Protocol 1 ensures that a party to the conﬂict
shall be responsible for all acts by persons forming part of its armed
forces’.107
In the Armed Activities Case, the International Court of Justice,
having concluded that Uganda was an occupying power in Ituri, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, found that:
Uganda’s responsibility is engaged both for any acts of its military that vio-
lated its international obligations and for any lack of vigilance in preventing
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by other actors
present in the occupied territory, including rebel groups acting on their own
account.
The Court notes that Uganda at all times has responsibility for all actions and
omissions of its own military forces in the territory of the DRC in breach of its
obligations under the rules of international human rights law and international
humanitarian law which are relevant and applicable in the speciﬁc situation.108
In the section on Palestine in its November 2015 Report on Pre-
liminary Examination Activities, the ICC’s Oﬃce of the Prosecutor
noted under Alleged Crimes’ that Successive Israeli governments
have allegedly led and directly participated in the planning, con-
104 Press Release, 17438/1/12 REV 1 (10 December 2012), at 7.
105 Annexe 1: Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva
Convention, Declaration, Geneva, 5 December 2001, § 12; See also B. Watts, Better
than a Thousand Hollow Words Is One Word that Brings Peace: Enforcing Article
49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention Against Israeli Settlements in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory’ 24 Paciﬁc McGeorge Global Business and Development Law
Journal (2011), at 451–452.
106 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its
annex: The Hague, 1907.
107 M. Sasso`li, State Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian
Law’ International Review of the Red Cross 84 (2002) 846, at 405.
108 ICJ, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of
the Congo v. Uganda) 2005 §§ 179–180.
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struction, development, consolidation and/or encouragement of set-
tlements on West Bank territory’ and that settlement activity is al-
legedly created and maintained through deliberate implementation of
a carefully conceived network of policies, laws, and physical mea-
sures.’109 While merely a preliminary document, the Report’s
emphasis on alleged acts of state oﬃcials reﬂects the idea that it is not
individual settlers who would be the subject of ICC proceedings
concerning the war crime of transfer of civilians, but that individuals
in positions of power (likely including certain settlers), those most
responsible for planning and implementing the overall policy of
transfer, who are likely to be identiﬁed as individually criminally
responsible.
The substance of two reports commissioned by Israeli govern-
ments concerning settlements not oﬃcially’ authorized by the state
illustrate the nature of the occupying power’s acts and omissions
relating to the transfer of civilians into occupied territory. Talia
Sasson’s 2005 Report, while eschewing consideration of authorised’
settlements or of international law, found:
the main relevant authorities involved in the matter of unauthorized outposts
are the Ministry of Defense and the IDF, including the Civil Administration;
the Ministry of Construction & Housing; the Settlement Division of the World
Zionist Organization; the Ministry of Interior Aﬀairs. … Nevertheless, other
bodies are involved in establishing the unauthorized outposts, including the
aerial councils in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, and other governmental min-
istries.110
Sasson found that the state had oﬃcially acknowledged and
encouraged the settlement enterprise’, until policy changed in the
1990s:
The Israeli governments were no longer oﬃcially involved in the establishment
of settlements, apparently due to Israel’s international situation, and the
negative position of most nations towards the settlement enterprise. That was
not the case for public authorities and other Israeli government bodies, who
took, along with others, a major role in establishing the unauthorized outposts.
Some of which were inspired by the political echelon, sometimes by over-
109 ICC Oﬃce of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities
(2015) para 68.
110 T. Sasson, Summary of the Opinion Concerning Unauthorized Outposts’ (10
March 2005), Section C, available online at: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Govern
ment/Law/Legal+Issues+and+Rulings/Summary+of+Opinion+Concerning+
Unauthorized+Outposts+-+Talya+Sason+Adv.htm.
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looking, sometimes by actual encouragement and support, but never as a result
of an authorized resolution by the qualiﬁed political echelon of the State.111
The Sasson Report, approved but not implemented by the Israeli
government, was followed by the 2012 Levy Report of The Com-
mission to Examine the Status of Building in Judea and Samaria’.
Variously received as a travesty’,112 and an ethical obstruction’ for
its treatment of the rule of law,113 the Levy Report asserted that the
law of occupation cannot be considered applicable’, and that the
provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention were never intended to
apply to the type of settlement activity carried out by Israel.’114 In
considering attribution of responsibility for acts to the state, a per-
tinent excerpt is the Report’s aﬃrmation that:
With regard to settlements established in Judea and Samaria [the occupied
West Bank] on state lands or on land purchased by Israelis with the assistance
of oﬃcial authorities such as the World Zionist Organization Settlements
Division and the Ministry of Housing, and which have been deﬁned as
unauthorized’ or illegal’ due to the fact that they were established without any
formal government decision, our conclusion is that the establishment of such
settlements was carried out with the knowledge, encouragement and tacit
approval of the most senior government level – government ministers and the
Prime Minister, and therefore such conduct is to be seen as implied agree-
ment.115
Regarding unoﬃcial’ settlement outposts’, Israel’s state respon-
sibility for transfer is triggered, whether by covert approval as doc-
umented above, or by overt and indispensable action in having the
Israeli military assist, enable, and protect those civilians being
transferred into occupied territory. The HRC’s 2013 Fact-Finding
Mission Report was alert to subterfuge on the part of the Israeli state,
111 Ibid at Section H.
112 Iain Scobbie, Justice Levy’s Legal Tinsel: The Recent Israeli Report on the
Status of the West Bank and Legality of the Settlements’ EJIL: Talk! Blog of the
European Journal of International Law, 6 September 2012.
113 Orna Ben-Naftali & Raﬁ Reznik, The Astro-Nomos: On International Legal
Paradigms and the Legal Status of the West Bank 14 Washington University Global
Studies Law Review 3 (2015).
114 Report of The Commission to Examine the Status of Building in Judea and
Samaria: Conclusions and Recommendations (March 2012), at 1, available at http://
unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/D9D07DCF58E781C585257A3A005956A6. The
full Report, in Hebrew, at: http://www.pmo.gov.il/Documents/doch090712.pdf.
115 Ibid at p. 3.
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noting that Government investment in the settlements has not been
made explicit in the Public Budget, but allocated through hidden
provisions in a process that has been described as ‘‘partially secre-
tive’’ and ‘‘a political tool’’’.116 The Report concluded that the State
of Israel has had full control of the settlements in the OPT since 1967
and continues to promote and sustain them through infrastructure
and security measures.’117
V TEMPORALITY AND TRANSFER
Addressing the Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute in
December 2014, Palestine’s ambassador asked: If the Rome Statute
states that the transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying
Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it
occupies’ is a war crime, then, in the case of illegal Israeli settlements
and settlers in our occupied land, isn’t it logical to go to the ICC so as
to prosecute and bring an end to this ongoing war crime and to
prosecute this continuing crime?’118
Andreas Zimmermann opposed the idea that the transfer of
civilians is a continuing war crime rather than an instantaneous war
crime: As a matter of fact, once settlers have already been settled in
an occupied territory, their transfer has been completed even if they
then continue to be induced [by state incentives] to stay in such ter-
ritory.’119 Such a conclusion was said to have been conﬁrmed by the
drafting history of the norm’ and speciﬁcally the decision not to have
incorporated option 3(1) of the Zutphen Draft into the Statute.
Zimmermann interpreted the phrase the establishment of settlers in
an occupied territory’ in the draft as hinting at an ongoing and
continuous character’, a meaning then, which was to be denied to the
term transfer’ as ﬁnally adopted.120
116 Supra, note 19, §§ 18–30, 20.
117 Ibid § 100.
118 Statement by Dr Riyad Mansour, Ambassador, Permanent Observer Mission
of the State of Palestine to the United Nations before the Assembly of States Parties
to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (thirteenth session), Gen-
eral Debate, New York, 15 December 2014.
119 Andreas Zimmermann, Palestine and the International Criminal Court Quo
Vadis? Reach and Limits of Declarations under Article 12(3)’ 11 JICJ (2013) 303, at
324.
120 Ibid.
PALESTINE AND THE WAR CRIME
International criminal law on the scope and nature of continuing
crimesdoesnot support sucha restrictiveopinion. JudgeShahabuddeen,
dissenting from a three to two majority decision of the ICTR Appeal
Chamber in 2008 that direct and public incitement to genocidewas not a
continuing crime, but, is completed as soon as the discourse in question
is uttered or published’,121 remarked There is not much authority in the
ﬁeld. This no doubt is why the judgement of the Appeals Chamber has
cited no cases in support of its conclusion.’122 In 2012, and also in a
dissenting opinion, Judge Canc¸ado Trindade at the ICJ noted that al-
though the notion of continuing situation has roots in the international
legal thinking of as early as the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, it has
passed almost unnoticed, and remains virtually unexplored, in doctrinal
writings to date, in public international law.’123
The subject has been addressed by the ICC on several occasions,
and can be understood as comprising two distinct yet often over-
lapping concepts. The ﬁrst concerns the Court’s temporal jurisdiction
and whether a crime such as the transfer of civilians into occupied
territory, commenced prior to the Statute’s entry into force, continues
in such a manner that the Court has the power to investigate and
prosecute (i.e. continuing crimes). The second concerns how the
Court views ongoing conduct characterised by the serial repetition of
discrete acts over a prolonged period of time (i.e. continuous crimes.)
At the ICC’s Pre Trial Chamber, Judge de Gurmendi considered
the majority’s reasoning with respect to ongoing and continuing
crimes’ to have been too narrow in the context of the Prosecutor’s
suggestion that the Chamber might decide to extend the temporal
scope of the investigation in Coˆte d’Ivoire. This was so even despite
the majority having accepted that crimes committed prior to or after
the date of the Prosecutor’s application were covered by the grant of
authorisation so long as they at least in a broad sense, involve the
same actors, and have been committed within the context of the same
attacks (crimes against humanity) or the same conﬂict (war
121 Nahimana et al. v The Prosecutor, ICTR-99-52-A, 28 November 2007, § 723.
122 Nahimana et al. v The Prosecutor, ICTR-99-52-A, 28 November 2007. Partly
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen § 23.
123 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening)
Judgment of 3 February 2012, Dissenting opinion of Judge Canc¸ado Trindade, § 72.
Also, Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v.
Senegal), Judgement of 20 July 2012, 145–153.
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crimes).124 While ﬁnding it inappropriate that the Prosecutor was
required to revert to the Chamber with further information in order
to investigate other crimes committed prior to the dates within the
grant of authorization, de Gurmendi held that examples of contin-
uing crimes under the Statute include those of enforced disappear-
ance of persons, enslavement, imprisonment, or other severe
deprivation of physical liberty, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution,
persecution and the crime of apartheid.’125
5.1 Continuing Crimes
Mohamed El Zeidy’s analysis as to whether the ICC could prosecute
crimes that commenced prior to the Statute’s entry into force and
which continue thereafter, notes that the issue was raised during
negotiations at Rome but was left for the Court itself to resolve.126
During drafting of the Elements a footnote was added to Article
7(1)(i) on enforced disappearances as a crime against humanity: This
crime falls under the jurisdiction of the Court only if the attack re-
ferred to in elements 7 and 8 occurs after the entry into force of the
Statute.’ El Zeidy concludes that since the drafters’ intentions were
directed and restricted to this crime, then the ICC may not be barred
from applying the doctrine and exercising jurisdiction over any other
crime of the same nature’ and that the Court is barred only from
looking at completed crimes committed before the Statute’s entry
into force as opposed to continuing crimes.’127
Such an approach was shared by Judge Pocar, also dissenting in
the Nahimana Appeal in a comment which illustrates the overlap
124 Situation in Cote d’Ivoire Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute
on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Coˆte
d’Ivoire ICC-02/11-14, 3 October 2011, § § 179–180.
125 Situation in Cote d’Ivoire Judge Fernandez de Gurmendi’s separate and partially
dissenting opinion to the Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the
Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire
ICC-02/11-15, 3 October 2011, § 69.
126 Mohamed M El Zeidy, The Ugandan Government Triggers the First Test of
the Complementarity Principle: An assessment of the First State’s Part Referral to
the ICC’ 5 International Criminal law Review (2005) 83, 91. Also Stahn, El Zeidy, &
Ola´solo, The International Criminal Court’s Ad Hoc Jurisdiction Revisited 99 AJIL
(2005) 421–431.
127 El Zeidy, The Ugandan Government Triggers the First Test of the Comple-
mentarity Principle’ at pp 92–99. CF Machteld Boot, Genocide, Crimes Against
Humanity, War Crimes: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction
of the International Criminal Court (Intersentia, 2002) at 371.
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between continuing and continuous crimes. Disagreeing with the
Chamber’s ﬁnding that the drafters had intended to exclude from the
Statute’s temporal scope a crime of which certain material elements
were committed prior to 1 January 1994’, Pocar wrote: I am not
convinced that it is correct to hold that a conviction can be based
solely on that part of the criminal conduct which took place in 1994.
In so far as oﬀences are repeated over time and are linked by a
common intent or purpose, they must be considered as a continuing
oﬀence, that is a single crime.’128
The ICC’s 2012 Judgment in Lubanga, citing the Nahimana Ap-
peal Chamber’s understanding of a continuing crime as one which
implies an ongoing activity’,129 followed the approach taken by the
Pre Trial Chamber in 2006 and 2007, and by the Special Court for
Sierra Leone in the 2007 AFRC and 2012 Taylor judgments,130 that
the crime of enlisting and conscripting [of child soldiers] is an oﬀence
of a continuing nature – referred to by some courts as a ‘‘continuous
crime’’ and by others as a ‘‘permanent crime’’’.131 The Trial Chamber
conﬁrmed that the oﬀences of conscripting and enlisting are com-
mitted at the moment a child under the age of 15 is enrolled into or
joins an armed force or group, with or without compulsion. […]
These oﬀences are continuous in nature. They end only when the
child reaches 15 years of age or leaves the force or group.’132
Rod Rastan, in contrasting the Statute’s treatment of enforced
disappearances perpetrated prior to its entry into force, and the Lu-
banga Chamber’s approach to enlistment and conscription of child
128 Nahimana et al. v The Prosecutor ICTR-99-52-A 28 November 2007. Partly
Dissenting Opinion Of Judge Fausto Pocar § 2.
129 Situation in the Democratic Republic of The Congo in the Case of the
Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ICC-01/04-01/06 (14 March 2012) § 618 citing
Nahimana AC § 721.
130 The Special Court for Sierra Leone in the AFRC judgment recognized sexual
slavery, child enlistment and conscription, and enslavement as constituting pro-
longed oﬀences or oﬀences of a continuous nature’ SCSL-04-16-T, 20 June 2007, § 39
& 1820. The Court in the Taylor judgment also approved of the approach taken with
respect conscription and enlistment of children in TC Lubanga Conﬁrmation of
Charges, SCSL-03-01-T, 26 April 2012, § 443.
131 Situation in the Democratic Republic of The Congo in the Case of the
Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06 (29 January 2007) § 248.
132 Situation in the Democratic Republic of The Congo in the Case of the
Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ICC-01/04-01/06 (14 March 2012) § 618; Situ-
ation in the Democratic Republic of The Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (29 January 2007) ICC-01/04-01/06 §§ 247–248.
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soldiers as continuing crimes, notes that while the elements of the
former constitute a series of cumulative acts – detention, abduction,
and denial – the requisite element of the latter is singular, such that
the essence of the prohibition’ is not merely the original recruitment
as a discrete event in time’ but equally the continued membership’,
even if commenced prior to the Court’s temporal threshold.133
As a discrete criminal act, a clear parallel can be drawn between
the crimes of enlistment and conscription of children as addressed in
Lubanga and the crime of transfer of civilians into occupied territory.
It is no stretch to assert such that the latter should also be recognised
as a continuing crime, committed at the moment parts of the civilian
population are transferred into occupied territory and perpetuated
until such time as the civilians leave the occupied territory.
By this reading, which also serves the legal values of opposition to
colonialism and the prerogative that occupation be temporary which
lie behind the criminalization of the practice of transfer, one can
readily argue that any transfer committed from the time the crime
became a matter of customary law has continued in full such that the
individuals responsible for the original transfer as well as the indi-
viduals responsible for maintaining the presence of those civilians
transferred into prior to, and present in, occupied territory from June
2014 are liable to ICC prosecution.
5.2 Continuous Crimes
Rastan concluded with respect to Lubanga and the enlistment and
conscription of child soldiers, that Strictly speaking, this is less a
continuing crime, but more an extension of the idea of repeat acts
that have their origin before the entry into force of the Rome Sta-
tute.’134 This is also the case with respect to the transfer of civilians
into occupied territory, since given the situation in Palestine, the
evidence will show that the vast majority of settlers will have returned
to Israel and been transferred back into occupied territory on
numerous occasions since June 2014. The very purpose of the set-
tlement project as a colonial enterprise is to fully incorporate the
settlements and settlers into the state of Israel, a policy which pro-
vides the basis for the charge of apartheid by its exclusion and
domination of Palestinians, and eﬀected by Israel’s claims to have
133 Rod Rastan, Relationship to Domestic Jurisdiction’ in Carsten Stahn (ed.) The
Law and Practice of the International criminal Court (OUP, 2015) at 173.
134 Rastan, Relationship to Domestic Jurisdiction’ at 173.
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annexed certain occupied territory. The project itself, and the transfer
of civilians in particular, is most accurately understood not as an
event’, but as a structural pursuit of a speciﬁc end point, namely the
erasure of the distinction between colony (occupied territory) and
metropole (Israel).135
The social and physical infrastructure embedding settlements with
Israel is such that one cannot properly conceive of transfer solely in
the manner as suggested by Zimmermann since the movement of
individual Israeli civilians to and from occupied territory is an act
repeated on a regular and ongoing basis. Judge de Gurmendi had
noted that a restrictive deﬁnition of ‘‘continuous crimes’’, or delic-
tum continuatum, includes only those crimes involving a multiplicity
of individual acts of the same perpetrator, each of them satisfying the
legal elements of crimes of similar kind, which should be treated as
only one act as a result of their tight internal and external connec-
tion’.136 A similar approach to continuous oﬀences, where each act
in a series of separate but closely related acts fulﬁls all the elements of
a certain criminalisation’ had been suggested by Judge Pavel Dolenc
at the ICTR: it is possible to regard the entire transaction, or series of
repeated crimes, as a single crime. For these acts to be joined to-
gether, certain linking elements should be taken into account, such as
the repetition of the same kind of crimes, the uniformity of the per-
petrator’s intent, the proximity in time between the acts, the location,
the victim or class of victims, the object or purpose, and the oppor-
tunity.’137
The multiplicity of similar acts constituting the transfer of parts of
Israel’s civilian population into occupied territory should be similarly
constructed as a continuous crime in the case of individuals prose-
cuted under Article 8(2)(b)(viii). In 2007 the Lubanga Pre Trial
Chamber138 held that while each instance of individual enlistment or
135 Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology:
The Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic Event (London: Cassell, 1999) at 163.
136 Situation in Cote d’Ivoire Judge Fernandez de Gurmendi’s separate and partially
dissenting opinion to the Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the
Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire
ICC-02/11-15, 3 October 2011, § 44.
137 The Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, ICTR-97-20-T, Separate and Dissenting
Opinion of Judge Pavel Dolenc, 15 May 2003, § 32.
138 Situation in the Democratic Republic of The Congo in the Case of the
Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06 (29 January 2007) § § 248. A
restatement of the holding in Decision on the Prosecution’s application for a warrant
of arrest, Article 58, ICC-01/04-01/07, (10 February 2006).
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conscription into a national armed force or armed group or use to
participate actively in hostilities of children under the age of ﬁfteen
was recognized as constituting a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court, the Chamber considers that it is advisable to treat (1) all
instances of enlistment into a national armed force or armed group,
(2) all instances of conscription into a national armed force or armed
group, and (3) all instances of use to participate actively in hostilities
of children under the age of ﬁfteen years, as a continuous war
crime’.139
Given the parallels between patterns of crimes addressed in Lu-
banga and the patterns of transfer of civilians into occupied territory,
it seems appropriate that the prosecution of an alleged perpetrator,
aligned with and responsible for the implementation of the policy of
transfer of civilians, be similarly based on each instance of transfer
cumulatively presented as a continuous crime.
VI CONCLUSION
The Palestine section of the ICC Oﬃce of the Prosecutor’s 2015
Report on Preliminary Examinations, under subhead Alleged crimes
by IDF’, reﬂects the tendency to consider settlement activity’
through the exclusive lens of state responsibility. One should not,
perhaps, be overly sensitive to a document which serves quite an
indeterminate function, and which stresses that its descriptions
should not be taken as indicative of or implying any particular legal
qualiﬁcations or factual determinations’. Nonetheless, in light of the
centrality of settlement and of transfer to ongoing widespread and
systematic human rights abuses under occupation, it is insuﬃcient
that, rather than address the transfer of civilians into occupied ter-
ritory as a war crime, the Report merely refers to a scheme of sub-
sidies and incentives to encourage migration to the settlements’.140
The destruction and conﬁscation of land and property, the repression
of the right to self-determination, and the implementation of an
apartheid system are both the pre-condition for and the consequence
of the overall settlement policy. Still, the Report chose to refer to
migration’ to describe the conduct criminalised in Article 8(2)(b)(viii)
139 Situation in the Democratic Republic of The Congo in the Case of the
Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, PTC ICC-01/04-01/06-1-US-Exp-Corr., § 105.
140 ICC Oﬃce of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities
(2015) § 68.
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rather than apply the Statute’s terminology of transfer’. Having
provided an overview of the nature, scope, and purpose of the war
crime in the context of the situation in Palestine, and conﬁdent in
concluding that this crime can be investigated and prosecuted with
adequate clarity and certainty, what remains remarkable is the ab-
sence of direct reference to, or acknowledgement of, the crime: It does
not, for example, feature in the OTP’s examples of crimes which have
been traditionally under-prosecuted’.141 The centrality of the war
crime to the consolidation of the occupation was clearly aﬃrmed by
Israel’s explanation of its vote against the adoption of the Rome
Statute. Appropriate labelling of criminal conduct is a perennial
concern of international criminal law, and while the situation in
Palestine encompasses a particularly broad range of international
crimes, it cannot continue to be the case that a crime which goes to
the core of this situation remains unspoken.
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